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A poetic engagement with the landscape can take many forms. I use the term poetic in the 
broadest possible sense: be it verbal, visual or musical, landscape art, as I shall call it, is 
generally regarded as having a poetic dimension if it evokes or gestures towards 
something we cannot quite grasp or articulate. Evoking and gesturing are, generally 
speaking, the raison d'etre of the poetic work of art. This is uncontentious if it is some 
facet of the human condition that is evoked or gestured towards, and while it is arguably 
the case that this has traditionally been the role of the poetic work of art, it is not quite so 
clear how landscape art might fulfill the same role. It is not quite so clear how landscape 
art, if it is genuinely poetic and therefore expressing far more than sentimental longings 
or apocalyptic fear, might engage with that which we cannot quite grasp in our 
relationship with the natural world. While it is widely recognised that this relationship is 
conflicted and in need of revivification or perhaps redintegration (restoring to 
wholeness), there would seem to be little recognition of the value of landscape art in 
helping to bring this about. There is at the same time a heightened awareness of the need 
to include the natural world in our sphere of moral concern, and in the task of articulating 
the principles for so doing, the discipline of environmental ethics is afforded the principal 
role. There is, then, a perceived disjunction between ethics and aesthetics. I make the case 
that this perception is in fact a misperception, having its basis in an impoverished 
understanding of ethics and of the role of landscape art, and that if we are ever to arrive at 
what we might come to recognise as an environmental ethic then landscape art will have 
an indispensable role in bringing this about. Gesturing, it turns out, is a substantial notion 
with substantial implications which has a key role to play in this endeavour. 
 
Our human predicament is that we must relate ourselves to things unseen or inchoate or 
inarticulate. These are things which lie outside our experience, but only just; things we 
can intuit but which remain elusive to identification or articulation. They are things we 
can gesture towards, though only if we have the means of so doing, and art has 
traditionally been one such means. At the same time, there are things, perhaps also 
unclearly seen, that place a substantial claim upon us, things we cannot take lightly. Our 
inescapable human task is to try to understand our engagement with these things, and 
articulating these unclearly seen things has traditionally been the role of ethics. Both art 
and ethics, then, can be understood as dealing with things unclearly seen but which 
engage us nevertheless, each charting its own course towards a clearer engagement with 
that to which we find ourselves already beholden.   
 
Art and ethics have traditionally been separate endeavours, each charting its own course.  
That it should be so seems almost axiomatic; we see the distinction, and regard it as a 
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disjunction. The fact that we (as heirs to the Western philosophical tradition) don’t 
question this is unsurprising if we delve into its roots; these we find in Plato, who wrote 
of an ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry (607b5-6), thus between the rational 
and the ‘merely’ aesthetic. He thereby invests some authority in the disjunction, to which 
we then remain beholden. By regarding ethics as a purely rational endeavour with no 
essential connection to art or poetry, we buy into Plato’s disjunction, and by failing to 
appreciate that there is indeed an essential link between ethics and aesthetics, we are left 
with an impoverished view of both. By falling victim to this restrictive view, we miss the 
invitation to work towards a redintegration of our relationship with the natural world, 
which landscape art represents. I claim that landscape art, to the extent that it has a 
genuinely poetic dimension that engages the unseen facets of our relationship to the 
natural world, is an integral and indispensible part of environmental ethics. 
 
Environmental ethics: seeking the view from nowhere. 
 
It is not a new idea that there could be or should be an environmental ethic. Victor Hugo 
perceived the need, and put forward the possibility in 1867:  
 
In the relations of man with the animals, with the flowers, with the objects of creation, 
there is a great ethic, scarcely perceived as yet, which will at length break forth into the 
light and which will be the corollary and complement to human ethics. (Hugo, cited in 
Passmore, 3) 
 
The twentieth century’s seminal proponent was Aldo Leopold: ‘There is as yet no ethic 
dealing with man’s relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it . . . . 
The land relation is still strictly economic, entailing privileges but not obligations’ (203). 
Both Hugo and Leopold thus saw an environmental ethic as something which would in 
due course emerge. Leopold elaborates on Hugo, hinting that something more than 
strictly economic values are an essential part of what he called the ‘land relation’. 
 
The idea that the natural entity might have value in and of itself is also one that is not 
new; we see it in the writings of John Muir, for example, who in 1901 stated that 
rattlesnakes were ‘good for themselves, and we need not begrudge them their share of 
life.’ (Muir, cited in Nash 39). Muir’s initial inspiration was a cluster of orchids in the 
Canadian ‘wilderness’ which may have ‘lived, bloomed, and died unseen,’ a possibility 
which for Muir did not detract in any way from their value. In other words, he considered 
them to have value which was independent of human interest, a value intrinsic to the 
entity itself. Muir led the way in articulating the idea of environmental value, and it is this 
which environmental ethicists have focused on, aiming to establish some basis for an 
ethical dimension to our relationship with the natural world.  
 
We all ‘value’ the natural environment: valuing the environment is an integral and 
ineliminable part of our relationship with it. Most such valuing, though, is bound up with 
our material needs: as consumers of natural resources, it is inevitable that we are party to 
an instrumental or utilitarian valuing of the natural environment. A more desultory but 
similarly ineliminable facet of our relationship with the environment is the valuing, 
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which is bound up with our individual tastes and personal preferences. All are bound up 
with the way we perceive the environment, the way we relate to it and the way we make 
our way in it. None among them is even suggestive of a plausible basis for an 
environmental ethic; to the contrary, all would seem to be part of the problem. Seeking to 
lump all these together precisely as such, environmental ethicists have sought to contrast 
them with a more substantial notion of value that is essentially and uniquely 
environmental and to which we would be universally beholden. It is an endeavour based 
on the assumption that such a value might exist but has remained hitherto unseen and 
which needs to be brought to light or perhaps even spelled out. The assumption at work 
here is that there can be a new way of valuing the environment, and it is one that we 
ought to wholeheartedly embrace.  
 
This assumption proves to be far from innocent. Implicit in it is the view that we might 
come to embrace a new way of valuing, or come to be claimed by, or beholden to some 
value which has hitherto gone unseen. The assumption is that we have hitherto failed to 
value the environment quite as we ought, or in what amounts to the same thing, that the 
broad spectrum of values that come into play in our routine engagement with the 
environment has hitherto been lacking in some way. Furthermore, the notion of value in 
question would of necessity stand independently of the tangled web of values which 
inevitably come into conflict with each other, thus independently of any personal 
preference, and would be the basis for these to be critically assessed. Such a value could 
not be nominated, either arbitrarily or by popular vote, and nor could it be voluntarily 
declined. As such, it would compel normatively, as indeed it must if it were to function as 
the basis for a genuinely normative ethic.   
 
The value or way of valuing that is being assumed here is one that is independent of 
anyone’s biased viewpoint, thus independent of the colouring by preference and prejudice 
which the latter inevitably entails. We all have our way of seeing things which are 
coloured by habit, be that habit individual, cultural or historical. What this means is that 
we all bring our values to our perception: seeing is always seeing-from, with the view 
informed or coloured by our values. The point of the whole enterprise of environmental 
ethics has been to overcome this bias and, ultimately, to allow us to overcome the 
anthropocentrism which is purportedly at the root of our ecological woes. What would be 
required to achieve this is a new way of seeing; the view we seek is, ultimately, what 
Thomas Nagel describes as the view from nowhere (8).  
 
Anthropocentrism has been identified as a bias analogous to sexism and racism, and as 
such something we ought to overcome. But as Bernard Williams observes, this analogy is 
simply incorrect: the bias of the latter is to treat the privileged (white or male) perspective 
as ineliminable from ethical reflection, but to regard ethics as human-centred is no such 
bias, since the human perspective is indeed ineliminable from ethical reflection. ‘Our 
arguments have to be grounded in a human point of view; they cannot be grounded in a 
point of view that is no-one’s point of view at all’ (119). Williams’ point is that ethics can 
only begin from our human viewpoint; ethics must start from somewhere, and ‘the only 
starting point left is ethical experience itself’ (93). 
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Williams’ insight challenges the assumption that there might be a universal and abstract 
environmental value; the possibility of a new way of valuing the environment which 
would be the means of overcoming our ordinary, everyday valuing, conflicted, 
compromised, preference- and prejudice-tinged as it is, would seem to have been called 
into question. The view from nowhere, it would seem, might be unattainable. And if that 
is the case then all we are left with is our biased, incomplete and fragmentary view, 
which, far from being the solution to our ecological predicament, would seem to be the 
cause. This prompts the question as to how we might arrive at an environmental ethic, 
and indeed whether such a thing is possible.   
 
John Passmore, writing about the possibility of an environmental ethic in one of the 
seminal works on the subject, makes an observation that hints at a way out of this 
conundrum. He observes: ‘A morality, [like] a religion, is not . . . the sort of thing one 
can simply conjure up. It can only grow out of existing attitudes of mind, as an extension 
or development of them’ (111). An environmental ethic, therefore, would be something 
we might eventually grow into, though the question remains as to what form our journey 
towards it might take.   
 
Passmore is suggesting that the first steps in our journey towards an environmental ethic 
are already there in our encounter with the natural entity: that such an ethic, should it be 
possible, must grow out of existing attitudes of mind. The requirement would appear to 
be that we should find the means to overcome the conflicts and dilemmas that inevitably 
arise in our everyday encounter with the natural environment from within the values that 
we bring to that encounter, and that this must somehow be independent of our biased and 
incomplete individual perspective while at the same time avoiding any expectation that 
we could or should distil out some abstract and rarefied notion of value that would stand 
in a class of its own. This requirement is not straightforward and we risk stumbling on 
these first precarious steps.  
 
Charles Taylor offers us an insight that lights up the path that Passmore has directed us 
towards. He observes that the values that have the strongest claim upon us are also the 
most difficult to articulate. And they are also the values with which we most closely 
identify. This is the basis for his substantial point that ‘selfhood and the good, or in 
another way selfhood and morality, turn out to be inextricably intertwined themes’ (3).  
These are the values that are so intimately bound up with our sense of who we are that we 
cannot easily objectify them. These are the values where we cannot simply opt out: to be 
neutral or ambivalent about them would amount to being neutral or ambivalent about 
ourselves. They are the values involved in what Taylor calls strong evaluation. Strong 
evaluation comes into play in matters that we don’t take lightly: in a sense, we are 
involuntarily wholehearted in these evaluations. Strong evaluation can be understood as 
forming one end of a spectrum with the relatively superficial evaluation of mere 
preference-taking forming the other end.   
 
Taylor elaborates that the values involved in strong evaluation remain unarticulated and 
to some extent inchoate: strong evaluation apprehends fundamental values that can never 
be fully known or grasped, being values that are intimately bound up with our sense of 
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who we are. These values have a depth dimension, whereby they must always remain 
elusive to explication or complete articulation; they remain, to a degree, ineffable.  
Importantly though, this though does not stop us from situating and orientating ourselves 
in relation to these values, and indeed they are the evaluations that form the basis for our 
moral evaluations.   
 
Taylor nicely shows up the absurdity of attempting to derive an ethic from an abstract 
and rarefied notion of value. Williams has shown us that ethics begins with ethical 
experience, and Taylor’s thesis dovetails nicely: instead of trying to boil that experience 
down to distil out some particular value, we embrace the richness of it without attempting 
to describe it reductively or assuming that this should be possible. Thus, Taylor and 
Williams offer us considerable insight into the process of being ethical. But the question 
remains as to how we are to be environmentally ethical: how we might understand 
environmental values as being intimately bound up with our sense of who we are, and 
how we might comport ourselves ethically towards the natural entity in a way that 
integrates values that are inchoate and ineffable. 
 
A middle path, the middle voice 
 
If ethics begins with ethical experience then we need the means to engage that experience 
in a way that its richness is respected. We need to find in that experience something more 
than mere personal preference, something more than an individual and partial 
appreciation of the natural environment. Taylor has shown us that there is indeed a depth 
dimension to our experience, wherein we find the sources of our moral evaluations, those 
values most closely entwined with our sense of who we are. But for Taylor, these are the 
values that come into play in our ethical relationships with other people; these are the 
values that inform our dealings with each other. Taylor does not offer any suggestion of 
how, or indeed whether, environmental values might also be found amongst these deeper, 
more fundamental values. It is therefore a possibility we need to explore for ourselves. 
 
Taylor’s notion of strong evaluation involves values about which we find ourselves 
unable to be equivocal and which we find difficult to articulate. These are the values he 
has in mind in his substantial claim that selfhood and the good are inextricably 
intertwined.  These he refers to as our constitutive goods: they are constitutive of who we 
are as agents for whom being moral is an imperative. Like all values, these inevitably 
come into conflict.  It is here that genuine moral dilemmas arise, dilemmas that challenge 
not only our standing on this or that issue but also our very identity, touching upon values 
so intimately entwined with our sense of who we are that our own being is called into 
question.  By thus being drawn to touch upon progressively more fundamental values, we 
touch upon values that become progressively more elusive to articulation, and it is 
inevitable that progressively more fundamental questions must arise. 
 
An inquiry into our most fundamental values can proceed neither rationally nor 
reductively; reason is silent on values, and we must travel by a different route.  But this 
does not mean that such an inquiry cannot proceed systematically: a systematic inquiry 
need not be a purely rational or reductive one. We do in fact have at our disposal a 
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method of systematic inquiry, though it is one that has been marginalised if not all but 
forgotten, even though the basis for it is found in the very foundations of the western 
philosophical tradition.   
 
Inquiring into the foundations of the western philosophical tradition is generally taken to 
mean metaphysical inquiry, thus into purely abstract notions about the ultimate nature of 
things and their underlying principles and causes. That we should regard this as normal is 
a reflection of a metaphysical bias which, as we have seen, is something quite entrenched 
in our moral reasoning, being already well established when Plato was writing about a 
quarrel which was for him already ancient. It is precisely this bias which lies behind the 
assumption that there could be or should be some universal, abstract value that would be 
the basis for an environmental ethic, and the failure of the effort to derive such an ethic in 
this way is a clear indication of the need to attain to a broader view than our metaphysical 
blinkers will allow.  
 
In order to grasp what an alternative to metaphysics might mean, we need to understand 
metaphysics as first philosophy, that is, as the study of being. The possibility of an 
alternative to metaphysics requires that there be an alternative facet to the study of being, 
or in other words, that there be a different way of engaging first-philosophical questions.  
Heidegger wrote of a ‘remarkable doubling [which] appears precisely in the 
determination of the essence of “First Philosophy”’ (Kant 5). For Heidegger, first 
philosophy has a dual characterisation, neither one being prior to the other, such that 
‘both determinations belong together as the leading problem of a ‘first philosophy’ of 
beings’ (Kant 5). Heidegger is directing our attention to something already long forgotten 
when Plato was writing about an ancient quarrel.  
 
Metaphysics is about assertions: it makes assertions about the underlying principles and 
causes of things. If we are to understand an alternative to this, then it would be unhelpful 
to assert that there are no such underlying principles and causes, because this in itself 
would be a metaphysical assertion. Logically, there can be only one alternative: the 
eschewal of any foundational assertions, or any such attempt to establish ultimate 
grounding or explanation. This minimalist, non-committal stance, vapid as it may seem, 
is in fact the basis for Heidegger’s conception of phenomenology (Basic Problems 2-3).  
For Heidegger, phenomenology is a purely methodological conception: it ‘does not 
characterise the what of the objects of philosophical research . . . but rather the how of 
that research’ (Being and Time 50). The ‘how’ he has in mind is one that respects the 
first-philosophical distinction to which he draws our attention, his ultimate aim being to 
reawaken a long-forgotten mode of inquiry.  
 
A minimalist and non-committal stance is by no means an impotent one: it does not in 
any way disqualify or disable our engagement with fundamental questions.  Indeed, it 
leads us to the most fundamental question of all, which also turns out to be the most 
elusive: the question of being. That is Heidegger’s famous Seinsfrage, a question so 
consummately general that there can be no direct means of approach. The lovely paradox 
which allows us to engage this most general of questions is that our means of so doing is 
via the most mundane, familiar things.  
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In stark contrast to the reductive and abstract world of metaphysics, Heidegger’s 
phenomenology invites us back into the world of ordinary, everyday things. He aims to 
reveal the poetic origins of our everyday concepts because he believes we will find his 
elusive Seinsfrage enfolded therein. If we read him in the German we find nouns 
bleeding into verbs (Sein und Zeit passim); nouns become verbs in a playful use of the 
German language, poetic in the original German but utterly lost in English translation.  
What he seeks to draw out is not merely the germinal trace of the concepts we routinely 
deploy, but the raw, unfiltered appreciation of phenomena, prior to their becoming 
crusted over with concepts; as such, his project is not merely etymological, but 
philological. His exploratory use of the German language dissolves away the traditional 
dichotomy of subject and object; instead, we find in his writing a doing without a doer, a 
middle-voiced approach to the question of being. The later Heidegger said that only a god 
can save us but it is clear from the early Heidegger that our salvation must come from the 
poets.   
 
It is clear that Heidegger held the poets in high regard: it was they who were on the front 
line, fighting to recover an elementary apprehension of phenomena, something prior to 
their reification by concepts and thus prior to any form of cultural or historical colour or 
bias. Herein lies the promise of meeting phenomena as if for the first time, thereby 
revivifying, at least momentarily, the elusive Seinsfrage. But we can extend these ideas 
beyond poetry in its traditional, verbal form. We can generalise Heidegger’s thesis: the 
question of being becomes a live one for us not only in verbal language if we engage it 
poetically but in any form of expression which is able to touch upon the ineffable and 
inchoate, thus to slip between active and passive, subject and object, and to enable a 
middle-voiced engagement of that originary intertwining of the self and its deepest, most 
inarticulate values.   
 
Gesture, the Seinsfrage and the middle-voice 
 
Art has the capacity to revivify the Seinsfrage for us but it comes with no guarantee.  
Engaging with art may be necessary, but by no means is it sufficient; the Seinsfrage is 
notoriously elusive. Somewhere between actively pursuing this elusive quarry and 
passively waiting for it to emerge is a middle-voiced engagement with familiar things 
that enables something deeper to shine through. The key notion that unlocks this for us is 
gesture.   
 
Gesture turns out to be an interesting notion, which dovetails nicely with that of the 
middle voice. It is noun and verb, active and passive, subject and object. Gesturing is 
something we can do or something that an artwork does. Gesture is something we can 
capture or something that an artwork captures. The classical gesture sketch of the human 
figure is the perfect example, being both the means of capture as well as the thing 
captured, something executed as well as captured by both artist and model, neatly 
straddling the line between noun and verb, active and passive, subject and object.  
Gesture straddles boundaries, but does not dissolve them: rather, it is prior, both whither 
and whence. 
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A good gesture sketch of the human figure captures something. Usually it is movement or 
mood, though it might be something more subtle, perhaps power or grace or some force 
or intention coming from within the model that shines through the pose. The same idea 
can be extended to any gesture sketch, be it of the human figure or not: it is not so much 
about the appearance of the thing but what it does, how its shape is an expression of what 
is occurring within it. This idea applies universally: everything has gesture.  Even a brick 
has gesture.   
 
Landscape has gesture, albeit more elusive than the gesture possessed by a brick or 
expressed by a life model; it is gesture which captures the particularity of place. We can 
make sense of this idea if we eschew any attempt to identify it as either subjective or 
objective, thus allowing the possibility that it is both executed and captured. Landscape 
art, be it visual or verbal, succeeds if it captures or executes something we cannot put a 
name to, and perhaps all the more if it leaves open the question of whether it is capturing 
or executing that has occurred.   
 
Our part in this middle-voiced engagement of the Seinsfrage begins and ends with 
witnessing.  It is important to note, however, that witnessing is not merely passive: we are 
not mere subjects passively observing a constellation of objects.  Simply observing and 
recording, whether verbally or visually and however skillfully it is carried out, will not 
suffice.  If we are to genuinely engage the Seinsfrage and to thereby capture or execute 
that unnamable something that slips between active and passive, subject and object, then 
we need the means to engage it in a way that preserves and respects its ineffability.  
Passive observation will clearly not suffice: if we are to genuinely engage the ineffable, 
then something is demanded of us. Witnessing has an active dimension.   
 
Embracing the ineffable 
 
The key to the active dimension of witnessing is to embrace the ineffable, thus to forgo 
any temptation to reduce it to something that can be conceptually grasped. This is the first 
step in approaching the middle voice of pure witnessing in which the intertwining of the 
self and its deepest, most inchoate values might come to the fore. Exploring this 
intertwining has classically been the role of art and literature, but landscape art, to the 
extent that it succeeds in embracing the ineffable, offers up a new possibility: that some 
kind of environmental value might also be among those with which the self is so closely 
conjoined and strongly enjoined that they cannot but function as moral sources. It is here 
that the broader relevance of our engagement with the ineffable becomes apparent: here 
we catch a glimpse of the reunification of ethics and aesthetics, the regaining of a prior 
unity by which both are empowered, in which an environmental ethic might appear on 
the horizon of their reunified path.   
 
Returning to Leopold, we find a hint that he would concur:  
 
Our ability to perceive quality in nature begins, as in art, with the pretty. It expands 
through successive stages of the beautiful to values as yet uncaptured by language. The 
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quality of [the natural world] lies . . . in this higher gamut, as yet beyond the reach of 
words. (96) 
 
Here in one passage we see Leopold, in his own poetic engagement with the natural 
world, charting a course that begins with our individual tastes and preferences and 
progresses through more substantial notions of environmental value before setting a 
bearing towards the ineffable.   
 
An environmental ethic, for which Leopold led the way in articulating the need, is 
something that will in due course emerge, but not something we can willfully derive. We 
do, however, have a part to play in its unfolding, a part which we can now see more 
clearly. We play that part well if we open ourselves to the possibility and the promise of a 
middle-voiced engagement with the natural world and an ongoing engagement with the 
ineffable. Our middle-voiced engagement is legitimated and empowered by our 
understanding it fully, thus in the context of the philosophical tradition and the 
fundamental questions it has raised. While the most fundamental of all have traditionally 
been metaphysical questions, Heidegger has shown us that there is an alternative and that 
this, the Seinsfrage, is there in our everyday concepts and our everyday engagement with 
the most ordinary things. The forgetting of this most fundamental of questions is now 
well known, but perhaps we understand it better by returning to the German, in which its 
Vergessenheit gives us the sense of something having fallen silent. Implicit in this is an 
injunction to voice this question anew. Rilke observed that ‘Ultimately, and precisely in 
the deepest and most important matters, we are unspeakably alone’ (18). We need to 
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